Comprehensive Reflections to Aid in Governance
By Sima Guang
Translated By Yiming Yang
Annals of Han Book 2 Scroll 10 (continued)
The 3rd year of the Emperor Gaozu (204 B.C. continued)
The army of Chu clashed with the army of Han along the expressway, which Han had built as a vital supply route. Han’s army soon faced a food shortage. The King of Han consulted with Li Yiji on how to turn the tide against Chu. Li Yiji proposed, “When King Tang of Shang crusaded against King Jie of Xia, he granted a fief to Jie’s descendants in Qi. When King Wu of Zhou crusaded against King Zhou of Shang, he granted a fief to Zhou’s descendants in Song. The Qin Empire was immoral, annexing monarchs and erasing their temples and shrines, leaving their lineages without legacy. If your majesty reinstates the descendants of the six monarchs, their ministers and people will be so grateful that they will heed your righteous call, willing to serve you. By occupying the moral high ground, your majesty can face south as the overlord of the country. Even the king of Chu will submit and pay homage to you.”
The King of Han was thrilled. “What a great idea! Go inscribe the seals immediately and carry them with you when you visit the monarchs.”
Before Li Yiji embarked on his diplomatic mission, Zhang Liang came back to see the king from a trip. The king, eating his meal, called out, “Come here, Zifang(Zhang Liang’s courtesy name)! One of my advisors has proposed a brilliant way to turn the tide against Chu.” The king repeated Li Yiji‘s suggestion and asked, “What do you think?”
Zhang Liang replied, “Who gave Your Majesty this idea? If you follow through with it, your campaign will be ruined.”
The King of Han was startled. “Why do you say that?”
Zhang Liang continued, “Let me borrow your chopsticks to illustrate my point. When King Tang of Shang and King Wu of Zhou granted fiefs to the descendants of Jie of Xia and Zhou of Shang, they had absolute control over their enemies’ fate. Do you have such control over Xiang Yu? That’s the first reason not to do this.
“When King Wu of Zhou entered Shang’s capital, he decorated the portal of Shang Rong’s household , freed Ji Zi from prison, and embellished Bi Gan’s tomb. Could Your Majesty do that today? That’s the second reason not to do it.
“King Wu distributed grain stored at Juqiao and the wealth hoarded at Deer Terrace to aid the poor. Can your majesty do the same? That’s the third reason not to do it.
“After conquering Shang, King Wu converted chariots into luxurious wagons and proclaimed an end to war. Could Your Majesty do that today? That’s the fourth reason not to do it.
“King Wu let his army’s horses graze in the pastures on the sunny side of Mount Hua, signaling he had no further ambitions. Can Your Majesty do the same? That’s the fifth reason not to do it.
“He also let cattle graze under peach trees to indicate an end to the transport of war provisions. Could Your Majesty do that today? That’s the sixth reason not to do it.
“All the followers who have marched across the country with Your Majesty, leaving behind their homes and families, are hoping for a piece of land. If Your Majesty reinstates the six monarchs, they would return home. Who would then follow you to conquer the realm? That’s the seventh reason not to do it.
“Finally, while Chu is the strongest currently, the six monarchs would likely side with Chu. Who would listen to Your Majesty then? That’s the eighth reason not to adopt this plan. If you follow your advisor’s idea, your ambitions will be derailed.”
The King of Han, shocked, stopped eating, spat out his food, and cursed, “That damned scholar almost wrecked my cause!” He immediately ordered the seals to be destroyed.
Xun Yue’s commentary: The art of winning in decision-making has three key factors. The first is macroscopic strategy. The second is microscopic tactics. The third is human psychology. Strategy involves evaluating overall gains and losses. Tactics refer to seizing or relinquishing opportunities specific to a situation and time. The psychological factor is about willingness and persistence. When results differ in similar situations under the same principle, it is because these three factors render differently.
Zhang Er and Chen Yu lobbied Chen Sheng to reinstate the six monarchs to increase the number of followers, and Li Yiji similarly lobbied the King of Han. The idea was the same, but the motivations were different. When Chen Sheng started his uprising, the entire country wanted the downfall of the Qin Empire. However, during the struggle between the kingdoms of Chu and Han, the larger picture was unclear, and not everyone wanted to overthrow Xiang Yu. In Chen Sheng’s case, restoring the six monarchs would gain him more allies and create more enemies for Qin. Since Chen Sheng hadn’t conquered the whole country yet, he was essentially offering something he didn’t own. This was giving out virtual benefits to secure real advantages. In the King of Han’s case, reinstating the six monarchs would mean weakening himself and aiding his enemy. He would gain a meaningless title and face real troubles ahead. Though the issue was the same, the strategic factor was different.
Song Yi employed a waiting strategy during the war between the kingdoms of Qin and Zhao when he came to Zhao’s aid. This is reminiscent of Bian Zhuang’s tiger-hunting story, where he waited for two tigers to fight each other and then easily killed the wounded survivor. In the early Warring States period, neighboring states frequently fought, and the waiting strategy worked in non-critical situations. There were many warring states with long histories, and the survival of a state was not determined by a single war. The objective of war tactics wasn’t to deliver a fatal blow but to gain incremental advantages. The winner advanced, while the loser retreated to regroup. A third party could observe the shifting situation and seize opportunities when an enemy became vulnerable. The circumstances allowed this approach.
However, the kingdoms of Chu and Zhao were trying to overthrow the Qin Empire, a much more powerful adversary. The survival of their states hung in the balance, shifting with every decision. Victory would mean a great triumph, while defeat would lead to disaster. Though the tactic of waiting was the same, the context and stakes were different.
In the battle during the campaign against the kingdom of Zhao, Han Xin’s army fought with their backs to the Zhi River, yet Zhao’s forces failed to defeat them. In contrast, during the Pengcheng debacle, the King of Han led his army near the Sui River, where his soldiers were driven into the river, and Chu won a decisive victory. What was the difference? The army of Zhao ventured out of their kingdom to engage Han Xin’s forces. They advanced when successful and retreated home if they faced setbacks. Concerned about their families, they were not mentally prepared to die on the battlefield. On the other hand, Han Xin’s troops were stranded against the river, with no escape. They had no choice but to fight for their lives, and that’s why they won.
The King of Han had ventured deep into enemy territory. He wined and dined his officers, and his soldiers enjoyed themselves, losing their fighting spirit. Meanwhile, the once-proud army of Chu, having lost their capital, was filled with indignation. They were determined to turn things around and save their state, ready to fight to the death. This resolve led to the king of Han’s crushing defeat. Han Xin had selected elite troops to defend his formation, while Zhao’s forces, filled with thoughts of home, launched their offensive. Xiang Yu deployed his best soldiers to attack, while the King of Han responded with soldiers who had grown complacent and indulgent. Though the battlefields were similar, the psychological factor was different.
That’s why I say: Strategy should not be predetermined; tactics should not be rigid. The key to decision-making is to seize opportunities as they arise and adapt tactics to respond to unforeseen events.
Reflection by Rio Grande 